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The nationality politics of 1989 in the Soviet 
Union according to the Gorbachev Foundation 
archives
Tsotne Tchanturia1
The developments of the year 1989 played a crucial role in the demise of the Soviet Union. 
Even though the „European” part of the 1989 events is widely well known to the public, the 
part of the story from the perspective of the Soviet Union lacks coverage. In the following 
article, the findings of our study of the Gorbachev Foundation’s 1989 archival documents, 
within the scope of the nationality politics in the Soviet Union, are presented. The review 
of the chains of events provoked by the Soviet intra-national conflicts will give a reader a 
better insider understanding of the systemic crisis of the Soviet state. 
Introduction
 
The year 1989 had huge significance in world history, the famous consequences of which 
are all too well know to us. According to the editor of the Gorbachev Foundation’s analytical 
report on the significance of the year 1989, „1989 was the chronological and semantic peak of 
Gorbachev’s Perestroika” [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010: 6].
In the following article, we would like to present the findings of our study of the Gorbachev 
Foundation’s 1989 archival documents, within the scope of the nationality politics in the Soviet 
Union. From the excerpts of Politburo meetings, we can understand the crucial significance of 
the intra-national processes during the late 1980s in the Soviet Union. „Intra-national relations 
are the most crucial base of our state,” mentioned Gorbachev at the CPSU Politburo meeting 
on 11 June 1987, „if these foundations do not stay standing, everything else will start to crack” 
[Belyaev(ed.),(7) 2008: 95]. „We should look at every problem in the Soviet Union from the 
prism of intra-national relations,” further noted Gorbachev on 11 April 1988 [Belyaev(ed.),(10) 
2009: 229]. In short, nationality, and identity in general, was among the most crucial elements of 
the Soviet systemic crisis in 1989 that finally caused its formal demise in 1991.
The chronology of events, along with the collected passages from various types of archival 
documents concerning nationality politics, covers the processes developing at the judicial level 
(e.g. declarations of state sovereignty and laws on state language by Union Republics, decla-
rations by the Autonomous Republics/Oblasts demanding a higher status of sovereignty from 
Moscow, resolutions declaring the 1939 German-Soviet Pact lawless, abolition of Article 6 of the 
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Constitution (on the monopoly of the CPSU), etc.) and at the factual level (e.g. demonstrations 
demanding independence or a higher status of sovereignty, clashes between different nations 
and ethnicities provoked by separatist demands, interventions by the Soviet army for normaliza-
tion of the critical situation, etc.).
During our research, we reviewed six edited volumes of Gorbachev’s selected works, including 
up to 3000 pages of archival documents from the entire period of 1989, and two edited volumes 
on the chronology of the Gorbachev period. Our scope was narrowed to the nationality politics 
in the Soviet Union during 1989. The collected passages cover the events taking place in almost 
every republic of the Soviet Union, except the Kyrghyz and the Tajik Republics. Concerning 
the Turkmen Republic, only one chronological item was present, notifying that on the festive 
manifestation of May 1 in Aşgabat, a group of youth organized a protest [Zdravomislova(ed.), 
2010]. Most of the passages from the reviewed literature concern developments in the Baltic 
Republics, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Ukraine, Russia and Moldova. Accordingly, our article 
is comprised of chapters titled by the names of the respective republics, where the processes of 
crises took place. Due to the fact that in some regions, the processes of the crises were closely 
interconnected, we have decided to group these interconnected republics in different chapters 
(e.g. Azerbaijan and Armenia in one chapter, and the Baltic Republics in another).
 
1. The political crisis in general
 
At the first Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union (May 30, 1989) Gorbachev de-
fined the three major fields of Perestroika’s nationality politics: 1. The political field (in which the 
rights of republics and autonomous entities should be expanded); 2. The economic field (which 
should be reorganized in the form of an above-regulated union of economically self-regulating 
entities); 3. The spiritual field (in which the diversity of national cultures should be recognized) 
[Belyaev(ed.),(14)2010]. In his address to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU 
(December 25, 1989), Gorbachev mentioned why Perestroika and the democratization process 
appeared to trigger social discontent in the Soviet Union. „Perestroika created conditions for 
the growth of national self-awareness and national pride in the peoples of the USSR, whereas 
the democratization of the society allowed the long-precipitated discontent to appear openly in 
public. [...] National feeling, as such, is a vital component of every healthily functioning nation, 
however, in the case of a lack of political culture and emotional intensity, a nationalism infec-
tion originates, which itself is a poison for the immune system of any social organism, leading 
eventually to its destruction” [Loginov(ed.), 2007: 110]. In defence of Perestroika, Gorbachev 
tried to create a discourse that discredits any kind of nationalist phenomenon – „no one should 
tolerate nationalist phenomenon in any form – whether local nationalism or chauvinism. These 
are offensive to human dignity and to any nation” [Belyaev(ed.),(15)2010: 78].
A political monopoly of the CPSU and the doctrine of one-party democracy was one of the cor-
nerstones of the Soviet system. The idea of the abolishment of Article 6 of the Constitution, which 
legalized the political monopoly of the CPSU, was very popular among the public during the late 
1980s. As Gorbachev mentioned at the meeting of the CPSU Politburo (November 19, 1989), „the 
idea of abolishing Article 6 is widespread in society, even at the Red Square” [Belyaev(ed.),(16)2010: 
403]. On 23 May, Sakharov was one of the first persons to demand the abolishment of Article 6 
publicly, at the demonstration on Luzhniki Stadium [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010].
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On the other hand, from Moscow’s perspective, abolishing the CPSU monopoly seemed im-
possible by as late as November and December of 1989. Leaving the CPSU is an illusion -remar-
ked Medvedev at a meeting with the members of the Communist Party of Lithuania in Moscow 
(November 16, 1989). On the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (December 25, 
1989), when discussing the decision of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania on 
secession from the CPSU, Gorbachev stated that the abolishment of Article 6 means open sup-
port for the aggravation of the process of demise, and urged the CPSU to condemn this action of 
the Lithuanian Communist Party without hesitation [Loginov(ed.), 2007].
Even though Perestroika and democratization politics created new freedoms in the repressed 
society, hard power was still an important tool of the Kremlin for controlling internal processes. 
„The army is necessary to avoid what happened in Sumgait,” mentioned Gorbachev on the first 
meeting of People’s Deputiees (May 25, 1989) [Belyaev(ed.),(14) 2010: 297]. Crime levels were 
on the rise and it would have been very hard to imagine any other solution to this issue in the 
Kremlin’s repertoire other than hard power. „We should use the KGB more actively for comba-
ting the crime. The main stimulator of the crime is apparent impunity,” mentioned Gorbachev 
on 31 July 1989 [Belyaev(ed.),(15) 2010: 379]. However, among the list of cases of hard power 
exertion by the Kremlin was the 9 April tragic dismantling of the peaceful, however unsanctio-
ned, demonstration in Tbilisi, implemented by the Soviet armed forces, which killed 21 (mostly 
women and teenagers) and wounded several hundred. 
On 16 August, a dialogue between M. Klyamkin and A. Migranyan was published in Litera-
turnaya Gazeta under the headline - „Is the ,iron hand’ necessary?” Here, they presented the idea 
that the path to democratization in the Soviet Union might first cross through authoritarianism 
[Loginov(ed.), 2007: 69].
In his formal address to the public from the central television (September 9, 1989), Gorba-
chev stated that extremely harsh control should be implemented in every city and populated area 
of the Soviet Union. He called for delegating broader authority to every law enforcement entity, 
the improvement of their equipment, an increase of the troops in the internal army, and an imp-
rovement of the economic conditions of every soldier [Belyaev(ed.),(16) 2010].
Important actors in the ongoing political crisis were the so-called Popular Fronts. They star-
ted to appear in the Soviet Union around June 1988, during the preparation period for the XIXth 
Conference of the CPSU. Social movements in the Baltic Republics had a special role in this con-
text - constituent assemblies of these organizations were held during October of the same year. 
Later on, the same popular fronts started to appear in other republics and in the cities of the Rus-
sian Federation. The main goal of the popular fronts was the recognition of the independence of 
their respective countries. In parallel to this process, Russian speaking populations around the 
Soviet Union started to create „interfronts,” or alternative organizations to the popular fronts, in 
order to save the union from dismemberment. Interfronts tried to reach compromises with the 
popular fronts, however, the latter groups refused to cooperate [Belyaev(ed.),(14) 2010].
The price of the collapse of the Soviet Union was very high, and Gorbachev appeared to be 
defending Perestroika by talking on the collateral damage that the demise of the Soviet state wo-
uld bring to its members (as a note, most of these anticipated dangers were realized). During his 
meeting with the Baltic leadership, Gorbachev highlighted that the Soviet states were so deeply 
interconnected, that breaking these links would set the whole country back by several decades 
[Belyaev(ed.),(16) 2010]. Demographic interconnectedness was the number one risk, capable 
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of causing an immediate economic shock to the whole economy by creating the huge waves of 
IDPs/refugees, as far more than 60 million people lived beyond the borders of their national 
republics in the Soviet Union [Belyaev(ed.),(16) 2010].
Another important aspect of the problem was that there were no real mechanisms to ac-
commodate the secession demands of the Union Republics. Article 72 of the 1977 Soviet Cons-
titution stated:  „each Union Republic shall retain the right to freely secede from the USSR.” In 
relation to this clause, Gorbachev remarked that (April 27, 1989), „about the right to secede from 
the Soviet Union – there is no mechanism. We lost it somewhere on the road.” [Loginov(ed.), 
2007: 67].
2. Baltic Republics
 
At the CPSU Politburo meeting, Gorbachev called the  Baltic region „the source of the sepa-
ratism virus” in the Soviet Union (March 3, 1989). On 18 January 1989, the Estonian SSR was the 
first of the Baltic Republics to adopt a law on the state status of the native language. Nearly a week 
later, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet followed the same path (January 26, 1989), and on May 7, 
the Latvian. At the 24 January Politburo meeting, Gorbachev mentioned that the Kremlin was 
ready for experiments (in the Baltic Republics) with the „national economy” and „democracy,” 
but  they first needed to invent a mechanism capable of saving the whole union complex from 
collapse [Belyaev(ed.),(13) 2010]. Later on, the Politburo decided to form a special commission 
on Baltic affairs, headed by Medvedev. Summarizing their first meeting, Medvedev reported to 
Gorbachev: „Brazauskas [The First Secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania] has no real 
desire to confront even the most radical extremist elements. [...] Chebrikov was very harsh with 
him, saying – should we use the special measures, comrade Brazauskas? You know that we will 
not tolerate the separation of the Republic” [Loginov(ed.), 2007: 55].
On 22 February, an address by the Estonian leadership was published in the newspaper „So-
viet Estonia”, declaring February 24 the day of Estonian independence [Loginov(ed.), 2007].
In Riga, 250,000 people gathered at a demonstration of the Latvian Popular Front on 12 
March 1989 [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010]. Five days later, on 17 March, the Lithuanian Supreme 
Soviet finally decided to register the political organization „Sąjūdis” [Loginov(ed.), 2007], the 
movement that would become a symbol of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
From the 27 April Politburo meeting stenogram we can trace that the situation in the region 
was further aggravated. By Gorbachev’s words, in the Baltic Republics Russians were denied 
from buying products in the shops and the visiting wives of Russian military servismen were 
denied from receiving a registration of residence or a job. As Brazauskas reported to him, 10,000 
Lithuanian officers requested their dismissal. In addition, the Latvian Militsia refrained from 
making order of the nationalist demonstrations. „Estonians demand to raise the flags of every 
republic in the Kremlin whenever the meeting of the People’s Deputies takes place,” reported 
Lukianov to Gorbachev, who replied that the Kremlin would not follow the UN’s lead, and that 
only one Union flag will be raised [Loginov(ed.), 2007: 66].
At the 11 May Politburo meeting, which was primarily dedicated to discussion of the situa-
tion in the Baltic Republics, Gorbachev mentioned, that economic problems were also affecting 
the national character. By his words, the turbulent process of the raising the national self-cons-
ciousness of these republics was taking place [Loginov(ed.), 2007]. Intelligentsia was digging 
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into the past, which was followed by a process of re-evaluation of the meaning of „sovereignty,” 
commented Gorbachev. At the same meeting, Brazauskas presented the alarming results of a 
sociological survey in Vilnius, according to which the Communist Party had 17% support, whe-
reas Sąjūdis had 70%. Vagris (The First Secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia) suggested 
the offering of more freedoms to the republics and providing them with more definite informa-
tion concerning the 1939 German–Soviet Pact. Väljas (The First Secretary of the Communist 
Party of Estonia) noted that the Estonian communist party had lost its power since the Spring of 
1988, after punishing the nationalist activists. Since then, „we lost the Estonian working class,” 
he remarked [Belyaev(ed.),(14) 2010: 518].
The next week (May 18, 1989), the Supreme Soviets of Lithuania and Estonia discussed the 
1939 German–Soviet Pact and demanded its declaration as illegal from the moment of signa-
ture. The Latvian Supreme Soviet soon joined their demand [Loginov(ed.), 2007]. On the same 
day, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declared the sovereignty of the republic, which was follo-
wed by the Latvian SSR on 28 July of the same year [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010]. The Estonian 
Supreme Soviet had already declared the sovereignty of the republic in 1988, on 16 November 
[Loginov(ed.), 2007].
On 8 August, the law of the Latvian SSR was published in the „Soviet Latvia” newspaper, 
according to which the sovereignty of Latvia was declared with the rights to its own statehood, 
the free development of the Latvian language, the national culture, and the economy. On 22 
August, the findings of the special commission of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania on the 1939 
German–Soviet Pact were published. The commission found these agreements to be illegal, 
and accordingly, the laws on the Lithuanian membership to the Soviet Union were declared to 
have no judicial power. These important changes were followed by multiple manifestations, in 
all the three republics, on the 50th anniversary of the German–Soviet Pact (August 23, 1989) 
[Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010].
At a Politburo meeting with the Baltic leadership (September 13, 1989), Gorbachev high-
lighted three main principles essential for the Baltic Republics, and more broadly for the Soviet 
Union: 1. All problems should be solved only within the frameworks of the federation, without 
separation; 2. The unity of the CPSU should not be disturbed; 3. Equality of all nationalities, 
regardless of their place of residence, should be defended [Belyaev(ed.),(16) 2010]. Regardless of 
the Kremlin’s instructions, the Lithuanian leadership asserted its independence from the CPSU 
at the party meeting on 20 September, and five days later, the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania decla-
red its 1940 unification with the Soviet Union to be lawless. In turn, the Kremlin granted wider 
economic rights to the Baltic Republics, alongside Belarus and the Sverdlovsk Oblast of the RS-
FSR (September 25-28, 1989) [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010].
At a Politburo meeting on November 9, Gorbachev noted that the Estonian and Latvian rep-
resentatives had such a feeling, that there could be no other way for them than to leave the Soviet 
Union. In his speech at the 2nd Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union (November 13, 
1989), J. Olekas (Member of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union) notified the Soviet about an 
address from the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, asking for a review of the law on general military 
duties, in order to find an alternative service for the Lithuanian youth, who, by conviction of 
conscience, refuse to serve in the Soviet army [Belyaev(ed.),(16) 2010].
From Medvedev’s speech, delivered at the meeting with the members of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of Lithuania (November 16, 1989), we can trace that only the 
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Sąjūdis had real political power in Lithuania. „Every decision of the party organizations, not 
to mention the Supreme Soviet, is made in collaboration with Sąjūdis. Now it is clear, [...] that 
this organization is managed by the right-wing nationalists,” noted Medvedev [Loginov(ed.), 
2007: 101]. As it seems, Sąjūdis was controlling the majority of the press in the country - in the 
same speech, Medvedev mentioned that 120 out of a total of 182 newspapers in Lithuania were 
under Sąjūdis control [Belyaev(ed.),(17) 2010]. The fact that the Lithuanian communist party 
was losing its influence on the mass media in general is confirmed by Gorbachev’s speech to the 
Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (December 25, 1989) [Loginov(ed.), 2007].
On 7 December, the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania abolished Article 6 of the republican 
constitution, which was followed by the public announcement of independence from the 
CPSU at the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania (December 19-20, 1989) 
[Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010].
As O. Zinchenko (the Head of the political department of the Baltic Military District) men-
tioned at the CPSU Plenum (December 9, 1989), in the Baltic republics, people were erecting 
monuments in memory of the „Forest Brothers” and the Latvian and Estonian soldiers of the 
Nazi SS [Belyaev(ed.),(17) 2010].
From Gorbachev’s speech at the CPSU Plenum (December 25, 1989) we can see that nine 
new political organizations were formed in Lithuania – the Social-Democratic and Christian-
Democratic parties being among them. According to Gorbachev, these political entities shared 
separatist ideas and discredited socialism, the CPSU, the Soviet government and the Soviet ar-
med forces. Gorbachev also mentioned the ongoing process of politicization of the Catholic 
Church, which was being manipulated by anti-socialist forces [Loginov(ed.), 2007].
It is interesting to see how the negotiation process between the CPSU and the Lithuani-
an leadership at the decision of the XXth Lithuanian communist party congress (concerning 
the secession from the CPSU), ended at the Plenum of 25 December. Gorbachev decided to 
postpone the official condemnation of the Lithuanian decision. „Comrades, Lithuanians will 
leave and think about how we proceed further in the future. It would not be serious to demand 
that Brazauskas change his mind right here. Let us postpone the making of a final decision. Let 
the representatives of the Lithuanian Central Committee travel back to Lithuania, where they 
can meet local communists and workers. We will discuss this matter and make necessary steps 
upon their return” [Loginov(ed.), 2007: 114]. Obviously, this was not the tone of the conversa-
tion the Kremlin’s leaders were having with their subordinates back in 1955, when Khrushchev 
practically threatened Hungarian leader Imre Nagy’s execution during their meeting in Moscow 
[Békés, 2010]. But still, the subordinated party followed its own way (on 11 March 1990, the Sup-
reme Soviet of Lithuania adopted the Act of the re-establishment of the State of Lithuania) and 
Moscow still intervened militarily (on 13 January 1991, Soviet army sub-units entered Vilnius 
and occupied the TV tower by attack; 14 died and more than 500 were wounded) [Loginov(ed.), 
2007]. It is interesting to know that on 27 March 2019, the Lithuanian court sentenced Marshal 
Dmitry Yazov in absentia to 10 years in prison for war crimes and crimes against humanity com-
mitted in Vilnius on 13 January 1991. „Another 66 former Soviet military and KGB officials were 
given sentences of between 4 and 14 years. Only two of them were present in the courtroom,” 
commented the BBC [BBC, 2019].
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3. Ukraine and Belarus
 
On 11 February, the Ukrainian Popular Front’s program was presented at the meeting of the 
Ukrainian Writers’ Union [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010].
Gorbachev’s understanding of Ukrainian nationalism can be traced by looking at the CPSU 
Politburo meeting minutes (March 3, 1989). According to him, compared to the other parts of 
the USSR, the nationality question had an absolutely different character in the Slavic states (Uk-
raine and Belarus), because everything was so deeply connected with Russia. Obviously, the role 
of the Russian language had been a dominant factor there  – by Gorbachev’s words, even Ukra-
inians and Belorussians had no desire to enrol their children in their „own” schools, especially 
in cities. Gorbachev said that he could see the motivation of Ukrainian and Belorussian writers 
– unless, „who is going to read their writings in their own language?” [Loginov(ed.), 2007: 58]. 
According to him, the first thing that comes to „our” mind when we hear the words „Western 
Ukraine” and „Western Belarus” are the Benders, the „Forest Brothers,” and 1939.
The problem with demanding a review of the internal borders was present in Ukraine as well. 
According to Chebrikov’s réplique at the CPSU Politburo meeting (April 27, 1989), Crimea and 
Donbass were demanding that Moscow review the internal borders of Ukraine [Belyaev(ed.),(17) 
2010]. As it seems, the same situation was present in Kharkov as well - „what happened in Uk-
raine when they tried to encroach the Russian language? Donbass and Kharkov immediately 
demanded to leave Ukraine and join Russia” (October 4, 1989) [Loginov(ed.), 2007: 96]. As far 
as Crimea is concerned, there were interesting conversations at the CPSU Politburo meeting 
in July of 1987 concerning the resolution of the Crimean problem. Triggered  by the Crimean 
Tatar's demonstrations, the CPSU was discussing different scenarios for the problem resolution. 
Solomentsev offered to hand Crimea over to Russia, referring to Lenin’s Decree on October 18, 
1921. „From a historical and political point of view, it would have been fair to return Crimea 
back to Russia, but Ukraine will not allow us. [...] The return of Crimea back to the RSFSR would 
crack the Slavic core of the „socialist empire,” Gorbachev replied [Loginov(ed.), 2007: 19-20]. 
Gromyko remarked that he supported leaving this question for resolution to history.
On 6 June, notice of the adoption of the new law concerning the Ukrainian language 
was published in the Izvestia newspaper. According to it, Ukrainian was declared the sta-
te language, whereas Russian would have the status of intranational communication language 
[Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010].
On 25 August, Crimean Tatars misappropriated the lands of Bakhchysarai Raion of Crimea 
[Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010]. We should note, however, that this willful act was perhaps not a 
surprise to the Kremlin. During the meeting at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on 5 July 
1987, when the issue of Crimean Tatars was discussed, the Presidum agreed to artificially slow 
down the resettlement of Crimean Tatars to Crimea, as a temporary solution. Yakovlev offered 
a 15 to 20 year period for the resettlement. In the end, the exact number of years for the re-
settlement was not pronounced, but Gorbachev instructed the slowing of the resettlement pro-
cess, and the meanwhile improvement of the living conditions of Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan 
[Belyaev(ed.),(7)2008]. It seems that these „slowing down” tactics did not work quite well.  
On 8 September, the constituent assembly of the Ukrainian social movement „Rukh” was 
gathered. Three months later, on December 8, a notice concerning the first pre-election de-
monstration of Rukh in Kiev was published in the press [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010].
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4. Moldova
 
On 12 March, 20,000 demonstrators gathered at an unsanctioned meeting in Chișinău under 
the motto „down with the government!” The next week, on 19 March, two sanctioned meetings 
were held in Chișinău where the supporters of independence also took the floor and addressed 
the crowd. The same separatist slogans were presented at the Moldavian Popular Front meeting 
in Chișinău on 25 June  [Loginov(ed.), 2007]. Adoption of the new law on language on 1 Sept-
ember by the Supreme Soviet of Moldova, which declared Moldavian the state language and 
lowered the status of Russian to the language of intranational communication, became the trig-
ger of separatism in Moldova. From the end of August until the 25th of September, people were 
constantly on strike in Tiraspol and other cities in Moldova. Strikers disagreed with the new law 
on language, saying that it violated the rights of the Russian-speaking population, for whom 
Moldavian was not the mother tongue [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010].
 
5. Russia
 
On 15 April, the first working conference of the Russian Popular Front was held in Moscow. 
On the next day, the solidarity demonstration with Georgia, organized by the group „Moscow 
tribune” took place in Moscow. On 23 April, an unsanctioned demonstration under the super-
vision of The Democratic Union (liberal party, founded on 8 May 1988) took place in Moscow on 
Pushkin Square - approximately 70 organizers of the demonstration were detained from a total 
300. On May 1-2, several demonstrations organized by the interfronts took place in Leningrad 
(present-day Saint Petersburg), Kuybyshev (present-day Samara), Sverdlovsk (present-day Ye-
katerinburg), Omsk, Irkutsk, Gorky (present-day Nizhny Novgorod), and Kalinin (present-day 
Tver). On 21 May, 100,000 people gathered at the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow, where Yeltsin, 
Sakharov, and other leaders addressed the crowd. The same gathering was held at the stadium 
two days later, where Sakharov demanded the abolishment of Article 6 and the introduction of 
a multi-party political system. The Constituent Assembly of the Leningrad Popular Front took 
place on 17 June [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010].
From the CPSU Politburo meeting (September 8, 1989) stenogram we can trace that some mem-
bers of the Russian Federation too, had separatist demands. „Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia 
are demanding the status of Union Republics,” noted Gorbachev, „some members are asking for the 
creation of new autonomous formations, e.g. Ingushetia.” [Loginov(ed.), 2007: 90]. It is interesting 
to note that the first nationality-based incident during the Gorbachev period took place in Yakutsk 
(the capital of the Yakutian ASSR) as early as March–April 1986. Here, Russian and Yakutian stu-
dents of the Yakutsk State University confronted each other. The situation had such a critical charac-
ter that the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU released a decree „concerning some 
negative manifestations among the youth of Yakutsk” in early May. The separatist demands of the 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan ASSRs were present since as early as May 1987 [Loginov(ed.), 2007].
The Russian writer Valentin Rasputin, in his article „intelligentsia and patriotism” (1991), men-
tioned that as far as nearly all Soviet republics are multi-national and multi-religious, the processes 
of demise might turn all the republics into a Lebanon very easily. „Russia is facing the same threat”, 
he mentioned, „the processes of demise will proliferate like cholera throughout entire Russia, from 
the South to the North, from the Volga basin to Siberia” [Loginov(ed.), 2007: 76].
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On 21 October, the Popular Front of RSFSR was created in Yaroslavl, at a conference of the 
representatives of Russian popular fronts and democratic movements [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010].
 
6. Georgia
 
On 18 March, the Lykhny Meeting was held in Lykhny, in the Abkhazian ASSR. Demonstra-
tors, among which the members of the Buro of the Oblast Committee of the CPSU were present, 
demanded the status of Union Republic for the Abkhazian ASSR. The memorandum was signed 
by Adleiba (the First Secretary of the Oblast Committee of the CPSU in the Abkhazian ASSR). In 
his phone call to Medvedev on March 24, Patiashvili (the First Secretary of the Georgian Com-
munist Party) described his anxiety concerning the harsh reaction of the Georgian population 
to the Abkhaz separatist demands. On 3 April, the working meeting of the CPSU Politburo con-
cerning the Georgian–Abkhaz question was held. Lukyanov considered that the main source of 
the tensions was the Georgian extremists, like Gamsakhurdia and Kostava, and their chauvinist 
positions. Medvedev noted that the proposal for granting Union Republic status to the Abkha-
zian ASSR was unacceptable, however, according to him, Georgian nationalists should be more 
sternly dealt with [Loginov(ed.), 2007].
From April 4, unsanctioned demonstrations in front of today’s Parliament building, organi-
zed by informal Georgian associations, were held in Tbilisi on a daily basis. The demands were 
„Georgian independence!” and „Down with the Russian empire!” The situation became so tense 
that on April 7, the Buro of the Georgian Communist Party asked the Central Committee of the 
CPSU to implement a curfew in Tbilisi as needed. Later on, the working meeting of the CPSU 
Politburo, under the chairmanship of Ligachev, took place in Moscow, deciding to look for po-
litical methods of settlement.  The meeting decided, however, to send military units to guard 
the public institutions in Tbilisi without introducing the curfew. At the late evening emergency 
meeting of the CPSU Politburo members, with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, at the Moscow 
airport on 7 April (upon their arrival from London), Gorbachev instructed Shevardnadze and 
Razumovsky to travel to Tbilisi and to clarify the situation on the spot. The next day, Patiashvili 
reported to the Kremlin that the situation was being normalized in Tbilisi and there was no need 
for a curfew. He additionally asked that Shevardnadze and Razumovsky not be sent to Tbilisi, 
assuming that their arrival would aggravate the situation. 
The next piece of information about the Tbilisi developments from the reviewed material is the 
notice of the 9th of April main incident, according to which during the dismantling operation of the 
unsanctioned demonstration, implemented by the army, 16 people died and multiple were wounded 
in Tbilisi on the early morning of April 9. The next day, a curfew was implemented. Patiashvili and 
several of his associates stepped down from their held positions on 14 April [Loginov(ed.), 2007].
According to Gorbachev, one of the main reasons for the escalation of the April developments 
in Tbilisi, besides the Georgian extremists and their disorienting demands, was the Georgian 
Communist Party leadership. „They were supposed to go to the crowd and talk with them, and as 
it appeared, they were sitting in a bunker,” remarked Gorbachev at the CPSU Politburo meeting 
on 20 April. He found it very problematic that the Georgian Communist Party was unable to 
reach a compromise with the Georgian intelligentsia, which was in the end what escalated into 
the tragic events. With this comment, Gorbachev recognized that the Georgian intelligentsia was 
also a driving force of the demonstrations.  „The Georgian intelligentsia is deeply connected with 
KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2019/4302
the public. It is the bearer of the national symbol,” he mentioned, „everything there – the theatre, 
cinema and music – contains very strong national elements” [Loginov(ed.), 2007: 64].
Another part of the story includes the complaints from Politburo members, including Gor-
bachev, for not having correct and timely information concerning the tragic developments in 
Tbilisi and the events preceding it. „Perhaps it would have been a good idea if we had sent so-
meone from the KGB there for the correct information,” said Gorbachev at the CPSU Politburo 
meeting on 20 April [Loginov(ed.), 2007: 64]. At the same meeting, Ryzhkov complained that 
due to miscoordination, none of the Politburo members had information concerning the Tbilisi 
developments. „The army intervenes and the General Secretary finds out about it only the next 
day. Wherever you look, all the business is done without the Politburo’s knowing,” commented 
Ryzhkov. The minutes of the meeting finish with a réplique from Gorbachev to Yazov (The Soviet 
Minister of Defence), „Dimirtyi Timofeevich, from now on, the army should not take part in 
these kinds of affairs without the Politburo’s permission” [Loginov(ed.), 2007: 65].
On 29 June, the Georgian Popular Front was created [Loginov(ed.), 2007]. Two weeks later, 
clashes between Georgians and Abkhazians took place in Sokhumi, leaving 12 people dead. On 
25 August, the First Congress of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was held in Sokhumi 
and the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was established. On 19 November, 
the Georgian Supreme Soviet adopted an amendment of the constitution, according to which 
the right of „veto” on the Union laws and the right to freely secede from the Soviet Union was 
confirmed. The amendment also declared all natural resources on the republic’s territory to be 
the property of Georgia. Since 23 November, clashes between Georgians and Ossetians have 
proliferated [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010].
 
7. Azerbaijan and Armenia
 
On 12 January, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union introduced a special 
form of governance of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (Azerbaijan SSR), granting 
the Kremlin the exclusive right to control the region [Loginov(ed.), 2007]. The special form of 
governance was present until as late as 28 November of the same year [Zdravomislova(ed.), 
2010]. By early May, the situation had become tense in the region – part of the Armenian po-
pulation expressed mistrust in the special form of governance, demanding the restoration of 
the local government and the de-facto abolition of Baku’s official control on the autonomous 
oblast [Loginov(ed.), 2007]. On 3 May, a campaign of strikes started in Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Armenia. By the end of the month, Armenia declared state sovereignty (May 28, 1989). On the 
next day, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR adopted the resolution, declaring 28 May 
1918 the day of the re-establishment of Armenian statehood [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010]. 27 
June is marked with a demonstration of several-thousand people  in Yerevan, demanding that 
the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union recognize the right of Nagorno-Karabakh 
for self-determination [Loginov(ed.), 2007].
Azerbaijan started a blockade of Nagorko-Karabakh in August, which lasted until 25 Septem-
ber of the same year [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010]. As was stated by Z. Balyan (People’s Deputy of 
the Soviet Union), B. Oliynyk (People’s Deputy of the Soviet Union) noted on August 3 the threat 
of civil war in Nagorno-Karabakh [Belyaev(ed.),(16) 2010]. On 23 September, the Supreme Sovi-
et of Azerbaijan adopted the law on the sovereignty of the Republic [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010]. 
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What we can trace from the stenogram of the Second Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Sovi-
et Union (September 25, 1989) is that Azerbaijan was keeping Armenia under blockade as well. 
„We are delivering products to Armenia from only one route (Sadakhlo route [through Georgia]), 
instead of the total three, which is good enough to supply only 1/3 of the whole Armenian po-
pulation,” commented L. Voronin (the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
Soviet Union) (October 3, 1989).  According to him, a special airlift to Armenia was organized for 
product deliveries. We can understand from a report by N. Konarev (The Soviet Minister of Rail-
ways), that the population of Azerbaijan was blocking the railroads to Armenia. „People just need 
a couple of hours to block the railroad,” he commented, „women and children lay on the railways” 
[Belyaev(ed.),(16) 2010: 497]. Concerning this situation, M. Lauristin (Estonian People’s Deputy of 
the Soviet Union) demanded the qualification of the railway blockades as an act of terrorism. The 
Supreme Soviet eventually decided (October 3, 1989), to instruct the Interior Ministry, the Defense 
Ministry, and the Ministry of Railways to restore the functioning of the railways [Belyaev(ed.),(16) 
2010]. Nevertheless, the blockade was resumed in early December. As was noted by S. Ambartsu-
mian (the People’s Deputy of the Soviet Union) on 12 December 1989, the railways and highways 
directed to Armenia had been blocked from December 4 to December 11 [Belyaev(ed.),(17) 2010].
On 28 November, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union ended the special governing re-
gime of Nagorno-Karabakh and returned governing authority to the Oblast Soviet of the reg-
ion. On 1 December, the Armenian Supreme Soviet reacted with the adoption of a resolution 
designating Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Armenia.  In response, on 7 December, the Supreme 
Soviet of Azerbaijan declared the December 1 resolution of the Armenian Supreme Soviet to be 
an infringement on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. On 31 December, insurgency broke out in 
the Nakhichevan ASSR of Azerbaijan and hundreds of kilometres of the Soviet–Iranian border 
was destroyed [Zdravomislova(ed.), 2010] – according to the Radio Free Europe, Soviet Azer-
baijanis rioted along the Iranian border, destroyed checkpoints, by crossing into Iranian pro-
vinces with Azeri majorities [Radio Free Europe, 2009]. Interestingly, the Nakhichevan ASSR 
was the first territorial entity to declare independence in the Soviet Union (on 19 January 1990) 
[Loginov(ed.), 2007].
 
8. Uzbekistan
 
On 23-24 May, insurgency on the basis of nationality broke out in the Fergana region of 
Uzbekistan [Loginov(ed.), 2007]. There were clashes between the Uzbek and the Meskhetian 
Turk youth. On 3 June, the situation was further aggravated by the local Uzbek population, 
demanding that the Meskhetian Turk citizens leave the country. The Meskhetian Turk minority 
had arrived on the territory of Uzbekistan as a result of the Stalinist purges of the 1940s. They 
had been deported from the territory of the Georgian SSR, accused of taking the enemy side du-
ring the war. As a result of the Fergana pogrom, according to information from the Communist 
Party of Uzbekistan, 100 people died, more than 1000 were wounded, 757 houses were burned 
down, and 27 public buildings and 275 automobiles were destroyed. On 4 June, the Supreme So-
viet of Uzbekistan implemented a curfew in the region. As a result, sub-divisions of the internal 
army of the Soviet Interior Ministry emerged in the region. As was mentioned by Gorbachev at 
the Congress of People’s Deputees (June 7, 1989), law enforcement representatives were using 
firearms to re-establish control. On 13 to 15 June, Ryzhkov and Chebrikov visited the republic. 
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On 15 June, Ryzhkov delivered a speech at the party meeting in Tashkent, offering temporary 
residence to the Meskhetian Turks of the Fergana region in the RSFSR [Belyaev(ed.),(16) 2010: 
497]. On 26 June, the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union followed, confirming 
the implementation of Ryzhkov's promises [Loginov(ed.), 2007]. We should note that in parallel 
to these events, a public demonstration was organized in the Meskheti region of the Georgian 
SSR, where people demanded that the Meskhetian Turks not be sent back to Georgia.
 
9. Kazakhstan
 
On 16 June, clashes between the youth of Kazakh and North Caucasian origins (mainly In-
gush and Chechen) took place on the dance floor in the city of Novi Uzen (Guryevsk Oblast, 
Kazakstan SSR). The situation became so critical that on 19 June, a curfew was implemented 
in the city. A considerable role in the normalization of the situation was played by an initiative 
group composed of citizens with North Caucasian origins who had initiated the formation of a 
bilateral committee, together with Kazakhs, in order to work on a resolution of this issue. The 
committee eventually concluded that the main reasons for the youth clashes in Novi Uzen were 
not as much their national or ethnic differences, but unfair economic conditions and unemploy-
ment. A special governmental commission was also formed in the Kazakstan SSR concerning 
this issue. At the meeting with the intelligentsia in Almaty in June, Nazarbayev severely criticized 
the local authorities of the Novi Uzen city and on 24 June, several of them were dismissed from 
their jobs. As was  noted by Medvedev, Nazarbayev apologised to Ingush and Chechen people at 
the CPSU Plenum on 19-20 September 1989 [Belyaev(ed.),(16) 2010].
 
Conclusion
 
After reviewing and discussing multiple selected passages from Soviet archival documents 
concerning nationality politics and the political crisis in the Soviet Union, we can see that the 
processes of the union’s demise seemed irreversible in 1989. This was due to the policy of Glas-
nost that allowed the long-repressed public to express their discontent freely. Gorbachev obvi-
ously got it right, that the systemic reformation of the Soviet Union was vitally important, and he 
was likely expecting some serious turbulence in society as well, but still, as we see it, he underes-
timated the damaging effect of unleashing of the freedom of the expression power.
Why do modern authoritarian regimes take very seriously the need to gain control of mass 
media? Could it be that they learned a nice lesson from Glasnost politics? We cannot generalize, 
but as far as the modern Russian Federation and some post-Soviet states are concerned, who 
apart from the autoritarianism have a poor welfare system, we can see that control of the mass 
media, and of the freedom of expression in general, is the existential matter there for the political 
elites – people given the freedom of expression are more likely to convey their discontent, and 
if the local media is given the freedom to report on the issue, then there is a big chance that the 
legitimacy of the political elite will come under question.  
What kinds of processes might take place in modern Russia, under the conditions of the 
application of the Gorbachevist democratization policies, considering the fact that three decades 
ago, several autonomous entities (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia) were demanding 
separation? Could we claim that, since then, the level of political sovereignty and the social and 
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economic conditions in these regions have increased so significantly that if given of freedom 
of choice, they would not demand separation from Moscow? This is not clear, but what we can 
clearly see is that the basis for a separatist explosion is there, and the general trend of disintegra-
tion in the post-Soviet region makes the chances of this kind of explosion more probable.
Another important observation from the reviewed material concerns Ukraine. As we have 
seen it, the patterns of today’s crisis in Ukraine were already developing at the end of the 1980s. 
The demographic interconnectedness of the people with Russian and Ukrainian origins appea-
red to cause a major problem for the territorial integrity of an independent Ukraine. The de-
mands for separation in Donbass and Kharkov started back in 1989 on the basis of the language 
reform. As far as the case of Crimea is concerned, as was shown, the leadership in the Kremlin 
had considered the return of the territory to Russia a logical and politically and historically fair 
decision, as early as in July of 1987. The circumstances, though, which hampered the execution 
of this scenario, included the risk of exacerbating public discontent and potentially cracking the 
Slavic core of the „socialist empire.” However, once these circumstances disappeared or lost their 
significance, Moscow changed its politics. 
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